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I. INTRODUCTION
URING the Survey period, Texas appellate courts issued opin-
ions in several environmental cases. At least two of these cases
set forth important standards for parties attempting to obtain, or
1173
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for persons who would like to prevent a party from obtaining, a permit to
build or modify an industrial plant or a hazardous waste facility. In the
other case discussed in this Article, a rather broad reading of the meaning
of "water in the state" may expose many unsuspecting parties to potential
criminal liability for violations of the Texas Water Code.' Finally, one
other case decided by the Texas Supreme Court addressed the ability of
an insured to recover under certain insurance policies for environmental
liabilities and upheld certain "absolute pollution exclusions."'2 This case
was discussed in last year's Survey in the insurance section.3
II. A PARTY CANNOT APPEAL A FAVORABLE
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION BASED ON THE
FINDINGS OR CONCLUSIONS SUPPORTING
THE DECISION
The Austin Court of Appeals ruled in C.O.N.T.R.O.L. v. Sentry Envi-
ronmental,4 that a party may not appeal a favorable decision of the Texas
Natural Resource Conservation Commission (TNRCC, the Agency, or
the Commission) because the Agency did not grant that decision based
on all grounds urged by that party.5 The controversy arose over the at-
tempt by Sentry Environmental (Sentry) to obtain a permit for a landfill.
Several individuals, citizen groups, cities, and other parties challenged the
permit. Following denial of the permit application by the TNRCC, these
parties appealed the decision because the TNRCC rejected several
grounds for denial that the challenging parties had raised. The district
court in Austin ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the deci-
sion because the appellants were not aggrieved parties who had any right
to an appeal of the administrative decision. 6 On appeal of the district
court ruling to the Austin Court of Appeals, the appellate court held that
a party may file an appeal as to the result of a favorable administrative
decision, but not the findings or conclusions supporting that result. 7 In
essence, a party cannot "look a gift horse in the mouth."
While the appellants were undoubtedly pleased that the TNRCC had
denied the permit application, they were unhappy with the Agency for
not ruling in their favor on all grounds that they had raised. The
TNRCC's stated basis for denying Sentry's permit application was that
Sentry had not adequately characterized deep groundwater at the site
and had not established that the operation of the landfill would not con-
1. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.211 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
2. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517
(Tex. 1995).
3. H. Michelle Caidwell, Insurance Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 49 SMU L.
REv. 1127, 1144-46 (1996).
4. 916 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ denied).
5. Id. at 678-80.
6. Id. at 678.
7. Id. at 679.
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taminate the groundwater located beyond the boundaries of the site.8
The appellants had challenged the permit application on several other
grounds, including that the presence of the landfill would reduce nearby
property values and increase risk to air traffic.9
In evaluating the appeal of the TNRCC decision, the Austin Court of
Appeals applied section 2001.171 of the Texas Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). 10 This section provides that a person who has participated in
an administrative hearing and "who is aggrieved by a final decision" may
seek judicial review of that decision." The key question, according to the
Austin Court of Appeals opinion, was whether or not the appellants were
"aggrieved by a final decision" in the sense required by the APA.12
The appellants claimed that they were aggrieved by the decision be-
cause they did not receive all of the relief they sought. Citing prior deci-
sions it had issued, the court determined that a party must appeal from a
judgment rather than the findings or conclusions supporting that judg-
ment. 13 In what the court construed as similar or analogous cases, it had
determined that a party that was either successful in obtaining the relief it
sought or that was able to later challenge an issue reserved by the admin-
istrative agency, could not, rather than seeking reversal of the decision,
seek modification of the basis for the decision.14
The court then turned to section 2001.174 of the APA upon which ap-
pellants relied for jurisdiction of their appeal. Section 2001.174 of the
APA'5 provides that a court may reverse or remand a decision of an
agency "if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced be-
cause the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions"
are improper. 16 The APA lists six grounds for which a party may ap-
peal.' 7 Before reviewing these grounds, the court regarded as a funda-
mental issue whether the party's "substantial rights .. . have been
prejudiced."' 8 The court regarded as even more important the threshold
question of whether the party's claimed rights were in fact "substantial
rights."19
The court concluded that a person's substantial rights do not include
the right to modify an agency decision denying an applicant's permit so
that the party can have better ammunition to attack any subsequent per-
8. Id. at 678.
9. Id.
10. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2001.171 (Vernon 1996).
11. Id. § 2001.171.
12. C.O.N.T.R.O.L., 916 S.W.2d at 678, 679.
13. Id. at 679.
14. Id. The court relied upon Champlin Exploration Inc. v. Railroad Comm'n, 627
S.W.2d 250, 251 (Tex. App.-Austin 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.) and Gulf States Utils. v. Coali-
tion of Cities, 883 S.W.2d 739, 746-47 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984, no writ).
15. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2001.174 (Vernon 1996).
16. Id. § 2001.174(2).
17. Id.




mit application.20 Absent a substantial right, no jurisdiction existed for
the party's appeal. 21
This opinion raises important questions about what, if any, preclusive
effect, such as res judicata or collateral estoppel, would apply to the ap-
pellants if Sentry attempted and perhaps succeeded in meeting the
TNRCC's requirements with respect to groundwater protection in a sub-
sequent permit application proceeding. If the appellants were precluded
from rearguing other objections to the permit application in the second
proceeding, then the appellants would appear to be aggrieved by the
prior decision. It would appear that logic and fairness would require that
the appellants have a right to appeal the agency's findings and conclu-
sions in either the first proceeding or a later proceeding. Depending on
the result, a party might argue that it is denied its due process rights
under the United States and Texas constitutions. In essence, if a party
could not challenge the basis for a favorable decision in the first permit-
ting proceeding and could not attack a second permit application on these
same grounds, the agency's basis for its first decision would be precluded
from judicial review.
III. THE AUSTIN COURT OF APPEALS ELUCIDATED THE
TNRCC's ABILITY TO REVERSE A HEARING
EXAMINER'S DECISION UNDER THE TEXAS
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT
A. BACKGROUND
In Hunter Industrial Facilities, Inc. v. Texas Natural Resource Conserva-
tion Commission,22 the Austin Court of Appeals faced a case of first im-
pression. In its opinion, the court elucidated the TNRCC's ability to
reverse a decision by a hearing examiner in a proceeding under the Texas
Solid Waste Disposal Act (TSWDA). Section 361.0832 of the TSWDA
restricts the ability of the Commission to overrule the decision of a hear-
ing examiner.23 The court considered three types of decisions for which
the TSWDA sets out the Commissioners' power to overturn a hearing
examiner's findings and conclusions.24 It then turned to the substantive
issues and applied the applicable standards.25 In doing so, the court set
out new law on the TNRCC's review authority over the decisions of hear-
ing examiners.
B. POLICY ISSUES UNDERLYING THE COURT'S DECISION
The first step the court took was to consider the policy considerations
underlying the Commission's role in reviewing hearing examiners' deci-
20. Id. at 679-80.
21. Id. at 680.
22. 910 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
23. TEX HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0832 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1997).
24. Hunter Indus. Facilities, 910 S.W.2d at 102.
25. Id. at 105.
[Vol. 501176
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
sions. The court focused on the Commissioners' duty "to prevent damage
to public health and the environment" and their duty to scrutinize "every
aspect of any facility that seeks a permit" for disposal of hazardous
wastes under the TSWDA.26 Specifically in Hunter Industrial Facilities'
(HIFI) case, the court pointed out the "significant health and environ-
mental risks potentially posed by HIFI's proposed experimental waste fa-
cility."'2 7 The court believed these risks significantly influenced the
decision ultimately reached by the agency.28
C. THE SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL Acr STANDARDS FOR TNRCC's
REVIEW OF A HEARING EXAMINER'S DECISION
Having considered the policy considerations relating to HIFI's hazard-
ous waste permit applications, the court then turned to the procedural
issues. The court considered the ability of the Commission to overturn
three types of findings or conclusions of the hearings examiner: (1) un-
derlying findings of fact; (2) conclusions of law; and (3) ultimate findings
based on policy considerations.29
1. Findings of Fact
The first issue related to the standard of review for findings of fact.
The Act provides that such a finding may be overturned "only if the com-
mission finds that the finding was not supported by the great weight of
the evidence."'30 HIFI argued that this was equivalent to the "against the
great weight of evidence standard."' 31 The court rejected this interpreta-
tion based upon statutory construction in case law that required the court
to accept the specific language set out in the legislation. 32 The court did
agree that the Texas Legislature's intent when it enacted this standard
was to "significantly restrict" the Commission's discretion to overturn a
hearing examiner's factual finding.33 The court concluded that the intent
was to restrict review beyond the substantial evidence standard. 34 Thus,
the Commission cannot overturn a factual finding on the ground that "it
would have reached a contrary decision." 35 Rather, the Commission may
only overturn factual findings "that do not find support in the 'great
weight' of the evidence in the record. '36
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see TEX, HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0832(c)-(e).
30. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0832(c).
31. Hunter Indus. Facilities, 910 S.W.2d at 102.







2. Conclusions of Law
The second standard of review involved legal determinations. 37 The
standard set out in the statute is that the Commission may reverse a deci-
sion if it determines the legal conclusion is "clearly erroneous. ' 38 The
court again rejected HIFI's interpretation that the hearing examiner's
conclusion need only be "reasonable. '39 Instead the court ruled that the
Commission must be allowed to apply the rules that it adopted and may
reject a legal conclusion regardless of its "theoretical reasonableness. '40
The court adopted the U.S. Supreme Court's evaluation of the meaning
of "clearly erroneous"-where the "reviewing body 'is left with the defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."' 41
3. Ultimate Findings Based on Policy Considerations
The third standard interpreted by the court involved ultimate findings
based upon policy considerations "if [they] involve compliance with or
satisfaction of a statutory standard the determination of which is commit-
ted to the Commission's discretion. ' 42 HIFI argued that this standard
only applies where policy considerations form the basis of the finding and
not where factual findings also underlie the decision.43 The Austin Court
of Appeals determined that an ultimate finding "usually involves a con-
clusion of law or at least a mixed question of law and fact."'44 Thus, the
court concluded that the policy decision involving compliance with a stat-
utory standard the determination of which is committed to the discretion
of the Agency is equivalent in the legal sense to a conclusion of law or a
mixed question of law or fact. 45 Because of the frequent mixed nature of
ultimate findings, the court concluded that relying on facts in addition to
policy considerations is sufficient if it involves compliance with a statu-
tory standard.46
D. THE AUSTIN COURT OF APPEAL'S STANDARD OF REVIEW OF THE
TNRCC's DECISION
In reviewing the Commission's decision, the court ruled that it must
determine whether the Agency committed any legal error in overturning
the hearing examiner's decision under section 2001.174(2)(A)-(B) of the
APA.47 It thus charged itself with reviewing the findings and conclusions
37. Id.
38. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0832(d).
39. Hunter Indus. Facilities, 910 S.W.2d at 104.
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing U.S. v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
42. Id.; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0832(d).
43. Hunter Indus. Facilities, 910 S.W.2d at 104.
44. Id. (quoting Helvering v. Tex-Penn Oil Co., 300 U.S. 481, 491 (1937)).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 105.
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of the Commission to determine the consistency with the standards set
out in section 361.0832 of the TSWDA.
E. APPLICATION OF THESE STANDARDS TO THE TNRCC's DECISION
Having interpreted the meaning of the standards governing the Com-
mission's review of a hearing examiner's decision and the court's own
ability to review the Commission's decision, the court evaluated the spe-
cific basis for the TNRCC's denial of HIFI's permit applications.48 The
applications for permits were denied for the following reasons: (1) the
salt dome was not adequately characterized; (2) adequate financing to
construct the facility was not adequately demonstrated; (3) an urgent
public necessity for the hazardous waste injection was not adequately
demonstrated; and (4) the underground injection wells were not demon-
strated to be in the public interest.49 The Commission had determined
that these were the ultimate statutory or regulatory findings necessary to
obtain a permit, and thus a negative finding by the Commission on any
one of them was sufficient to support denial of a permit.50
1. Geologic Characterization
The hearing examiner had examined the evidence presented regarding
the characterization of the geology of the salt domes where the hazardous
waste was to be injected and the earth surrounding the salt domes. 51
While the hearing examiner concluded that the characterization was im-
precise, he nonetheless read two regulatory requirements together to al-
low a margin of error calculation of 500 feet between the injection area
and the edge of the salt dome.52 The examiner, more surprisingly, de-
cided that the characterization required to obtain the permit could be
completed after the permit was issued.5 3 Not surprisingly, the Commis-
sion rejected this decision.5 4 The Commission would not allow estimates
to substitute for facts required to obtain a permit nor allow the evidence
required for approval to be submitted after the permit was issued.5 5 The
Austin Court of Appeals upheld the Commission's decision. The court
concluded that the Commission had the discretion to overturn a hearing
examiner's decision that was not consistent with statutory or regulatory
requirements.56 The court cited precedent in which the court had re-
versed the granting of a permit by the Texas Department of Health. In
that case, the department averaged two expert opinions about the depth
48. I.
49. Id. at 105-06.
50. Id. at 106 (citing Gerst v. Goldsbury, 434 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. 1968) ("order of






56. Id. at 107.
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of groundwater to support issuing a permit.57 The court emphasized that
the Commission had to be allowed to interpret its own rules.58 The court
noted that this was particularly true when the examiner blended two re-
quirements to avoid imposing expensive tests on the applicant required to
prove an evidentiary point. 59
2. Financial Assurance
The second issue appealed by HIFI was the Commission's reversal of
the examiner's determination that the applicant had demonstrated ade-
quate financial assurance to complete construction of the facility.60 TWo
witnesses had been offered by HIFI during the hearing. One witness tes-
tified that to complete construction HIFI could use both equity and long-
term debt financing, while the other testified that the institutional debt
market would probably not be used.61 Both testified, however, that ade-
quate financing was available. 62 The court overturned the Commission's
reversal of the examiner's finding that adequate financing was shown.63
It held that the Commission had overstepped its bounds under the stan-
dard set out in section 361.0832(c) for factual determinations.64 No con-
flict existed between the testimony. One expert only stated that he did
not anticipate the use of one type of financing. 65 The court did not be-
lieve that any evidence supported the finding that the applicant failed to
show adequate financing was available. 66
3. Public Necessity and Public Interest
Finally, the TNRCC denied permits for the proposed hazardous waste
facility on the grounds that the hearing examiner erred in concluding that
there existed an urgent public necessity for the facility and that construc-
tion and operation of the facility would be in the public interest.67 An
urgent public necessity must be found before the TNRCC may issue such
permits.68 Five criteria for evaluating a purported "urgent public neces-
sity" are set forth in the TSWDA and the Water Code.69 Under the
Water Code, the Commission must also conclude that the injection well
would further the public interest.70 In addressing these broad questions,




60. Id. at 108.
61. Id. at 108-09.






68. Id.; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.114(6).
69. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.114(b); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.
§ 27.051(g)(2) (Vernon 1995).
70. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.051(a)(1) (Vernon 1995).
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the Commission focused upon need and safety as the critical questions in
making the determination of public necessity.71
a. Need
The TNRCC focused on the question of the capacity needed to manage
hazardous waste generated in the state 72 and whether practical, eco-
nomic, and feasible alternatives to an injection well are reasonably avail-
able. 73 The Agency also had to consider the need for different types of
technologies for hazardous waste disposal.74 To satisfy these standards,
HIFI presented an expert witness who testified that a 1992 Texas capacity
survey, known as a Needs Assessment, had grossly underestimated the
amount of hazardous waste that would need to be managed in Texas by
780 percent.75
The Commission rejected HIFI's expert testimony and determined that
there was not a need for the facility.76 The Austin Court of Appeals up-
held this decision. While HIFI's expert was the only expert that testified
at the hearing before the hearing examiner, a TNRCC employee com-
mented on the need question at the hearing before the Commissioners
themselves. 77 As the primary fact finding agency, the court allowed the
Commission to reject the testimony.78 It allowed the Commission to dis-
count expert testimony if it does not believe it to be credible and to re-
solve factual ambiguities.79 HIFI argued that the state's own 1992 study
showed a need existed. 80 The court ruled that the TNRCC could deny a
permit if a need for the specific facility does not exist.8 ' In applying the
"great weight of the evidence" standard to the factual determination of
need, the court deferred to the specialized expertise of the agency and
left the question to its discretion. 82 Part of the court's decision depended
upon the "untested and experimental method of irretrievable waste injec-
tion into salt domes." 83
HIFI alternatively argued that if the standard did not allow the permit-
ting of its facility, the requirements were too vague and ambiguous and it
was not told prior to the evidentiary hearing that it had failed to meet
that evidentiary standard. Thus, it argued the decision did not comport
with constitutional due process requirements. 84 The court again rejected
71. Hunter Indus. Facilities, 910 S.W. 2d at 109, 112.
72. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.114(b)(2); TEX. WATER CODE
ANN. § 27.051(g)(2)(B).
73. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 27.051(d)(2), 27.051(g)(2)(B).
74. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.0232(a).
75. Hunter Indus. Facilities, 910 S.W.2d at 109-10.
76. Id. at 110.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 111.
80. Id.






HIFI's arguments.85 In considering this dialogue, the court first con-
cluded that "substantial or obvious need" is a definite enough standard.
86
Second, the court ruled that a series of factors, including the experimental
nature of the facility, estimates of the capacity shortfall, the desire to de-
velop innovative technologies, and protection of the water supply, could
be considered in determining need. 87 In a footnote the court determined
that need was not an ultimate finding of necessity, but a factual finding
underlying the statutory determination. 88 Thus, it was governed by the
"great weight of the evidence" test for factual determinations and not the
standard for ultimate statutory findings.89
b. Safety
The Commission concluded that HIFI had failed to meet its burden in
meeting safety requirements. 90 The court agreed on most grounds but
differed on one issue: the safety standards identified by the court are
found in the TSWDA, the Texas Water Code, and in TNRCC regulations
in the Texas Administrative Code 91-including a 15,000 year no-escape
requirement.92 The disposal process is of interest at this point. HIFI's
process would have involved the solidification of hazardous wastes fol-
lowed by the injection of the solidified material down the wells into the
salt domes.93 The Commission determined that there needed to be evi-
dence showing that the process would work over time. The court con-
cluded this was critical because the material could not be retrieved from
the salt domes if the process failed.94
The Commission's decision that HIFI failed to show the safety of the
proposed facility was based on six grounds: the Commission determined
that HIFI had not presented adequate evidence to show that (1) the
waste will not migrate over the 15,000 year period, (2) solidification will
work on all wastes and will remain solidified, (3) gas and pressure will not
build in the salt domes, (4) the injection area would be a safe distance
from the edge of the salt dome, (5) the waste analysis and classification
plan was adequate, and (6) adequate chain-of-custody plans would be in
place for waste samples being analyzed.95 The court upheld all but the
Commission's reversal of the hearing examiner's findings on waste classi-




88. Id. at 112 n.17.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 112; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.114(b)(1), (3), (4); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 27.051(g)(2)(A), (C), (D); 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 331.162.
92. 30 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 331.162.






court focused primarily on the 15,000 year no-escape requirement. 97 The
court believed this to be an incredible burden to meet. Coupling this
incredible burden with the "high stakes" of hazardous waste facilities for
health and the environment, the court concluded that the Commission
had "no margin for error."'98
F. ANALYSIS OF COURT'S DECISION
On this last basis no one should be surprised that the company failed to
obtain the requisite permits to construct and operate its proposed salt
dome facility for disposal of hazardous waste. The court seemed to focus
on what it perceived as the particularly risky nature of the use of an un-
derground salt dome as a hazardous waste disposal facility. 99 The court
may not have been so lenient in its review of the basis for the Commis-
sion's permitting decision had that not been the case. With the advent of
the land disposal restrictions enacted by Congress in 1984 and developed
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in subsequent rulemaking,
the 15,000 year no-migration requirement will be very difficult to meet. If
a "no margin for error" rule truly applies, then one may almost rule out
facilities that bury or inject hazardous wastes into the ground. The ques-
tion may be whether or not a "no margin for error" rule was intended
either by legislative or regulatory bodies. Even with scientific and engi-
neering models, measurements, and estimates, it may be very difficult to
meet this strict test.
IV. A CONVICTION WAS UPHELD FOR DISCHARGING
INDUSTRIAL WASTE INTO A SANITARY SEWER
WITHOUT A PERMIT
In a rather broad interpretation of the meaning of "water in the state"
under the Texas Water Code,100 the First District Court of Appeals of
Houston upheld a criminal conviction of a person who discharged indus-
trial waste into the Houston sanitary sewer without a permit.' 0 ' The
defendant, Gary Lynn McGee, appealed the case. He relied in his appeal
largely on the argument that the statutory meaning of "water in the state"
does not include a sanitary sewer. The appellate court rejected this point
of error and concluded that the specific criminal definition applied. 0 2 In
interpreting this definition, the court concluded that a discharge to any
"water in the state" within the state's jurisdiction includes a discharge
into a sanitary sewer.' 0 3
In this case, the defendant worked for a company that cleans grease
97. Id at 113.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.2121 (Vernon Supp. 1995).
101. McGee v. State, 923 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref d).




traps and septic tanks with a vacuum truck.1°4 Before cleaning the grease
trap of a grocery store, the defendant discharged the wastewater from the
vacuum truck into the City of Houston sewer collection system. The
system leads to the City of Houston publicly owned wastewater treatment
works. No authorization to discharge the wastewater into the sewer had
been provided to the defendant from the City of Houston, the State of
Texas, or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The material dis-
charged consisted of 94 percent water and 6 percent oil and grease.
As stated above, McGee contended in his appeal, that he did not dis-
charge wastes to "water in the state. 105 On this basis, he claimed he did
not violate the relevant statutory provisions.10 6 The provisions under
which he was charged are sections 26.2121(a) and 26.2121(d) of the Texas
Water Code. 107 Both of these sections require the discharge "into or ad-
jacent to any water in the state."' 08 McGee argued that a sanitary sewer
was not "water in the state." McGee's first point is that in the general
definitions "water in the state" does not include a sanitary sewer. Fur-
thermore, he argued that "sewer system" is separately defined to include
such things as pipelines, force mains, and other things for transporting
waste.
The State on the other hand contended that these definitions are irrele-
vant because they do not apply to criminal cases, but only civil proceed-
ings. °9 Another definition of "water" is found in the criminal section."10
It provides that "water" would "include both surface and sub-surface
water," and "water in the state" means "any water within the jurisdiction
of the state.""' The court applied the Texas Code Construction Act to
conclude that the more specific provision controls over a more general
provision." 2 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had previously
reached a similar conclusion in holding that a drainage ditch fell within
the broad definitions. 1 3 The court concluded that a jury instruction
tracking only the definition in section 26.211(1) was sufficient." 4
McGee argued that it makes no sense to construe as a discharge to a
water in the state a discharge to a piping system, that leads to a treatment
plant for treatment before being discharged to a water body." 5 The ma-
terial is treated and the discharge from the treatment plant is regulated
by state and federal authorities. The court rejected this position. It de-
104. See id. at 628-29 for a general summary of the facts stipulated by the defendant and
the prosecution.
105. Id. at 629.
106. Id.
107. TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.2121 (a), (d).
108. Id.
109. McGee, 923 S.W.2d at 630.
110. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.211(1).
111. Id.
112. McGee, 923 S.W.2d at 630.
113. American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 587 S.W.2d 679, 682-83 (Tex. Crim. App.
1979).
114. Id. at 683.
115. McGee, 923 S.W.2d at 630.
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termined that the fact that state and federal authorities regulate the dis-
charge does not mean that the state is without authority to regulate
"pollution of waters entering" the treatment plant.116 The court cited
similar conclusions of courts in other states interpreting similar
statutes. 1 7
McGee's next challenge to his conviction rested on constitutional
grounds. His argument in essence was that the criminal provision as ap-
plied to discharges to sewer systems was too vague and he could not have
known that his discharge would rise to the level of a criminal act. His
arguement consisted of three parts: (1) that section 26.003 makes it a
state policy to discharge into waste collection systems and that is what
McGee did; (2) the TNRCC has never required discharge permits for dis-
charges into municipal sewer systems; and (3) to make such discharges a
crime would result in the impracticable requirement that industries dis-
charging to sewer systems obtain TNRCC permits to avoid criminal pros-
ecution."18 However, the court did not find this convincing. It found that
no evidence had been presented that he was in any way confused about
the provisions or unable to comply with them.119 He also pleaded no
contest to the charges and thereby admitted the allegations in the infor-
mation which established (1) that a permit from some authority was re-
quired, (2) that he failed to obtain any such permit, and (3) that he knew
this and still discharged without such a permit.120 Because of these ad-
missions by virtue of the plea, the court concluded that the statute was
not unconstitutionally vague as applied to him.' 21
Finally, he challenged the conviction under a "double jeopardy" the-
ory. McGee argued that he was being criminally prosecuted for the same
act under two statutory provisions. 122 In analyzing this provision the
court turned to a United States Supreme Court decision holding that if
one provision requires an additional fact than another then the person is
being tried for more than one offense. 123 In applying this rule of law, the
Houston Court of Appeals determined that prosecution under section
26.2121(a) requires a discharge "(1) into or adjacent to water in the state,
(2) that causes or threatens to cause water pollution, (3) unless there is
compliance with a permit, rule or order."'1 24 By comparison, section
26.2121(d) requires "(1) a discharge from a point source, (2) in violation
of chapter 26, a rule, permit, or order.' 25 The need to prove different
116. Id. at 630.
117. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. EPA, 290 N.E.2d 892, 894-95 (I11. App. Ct. 1972); Arm-
strong Chemcon, Inc. v. The Pollution Control Bd., 310 N.E.2d 648, 651 (II1. App. Ct.
1974).





123. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).




facts for each charge made them different offenses. Thus, the court deter-
mined the conviction under either or both provisions to be
appropriate. 126
The interpretation of the definition of "water in the state" to include
sewers seems rather circular. The definition the court applied was "any
water within the jurisdiction of the state." To then say that any "water in
the state" falls within the jurisdiction of the state does not answer the
question. The question was what water is within the state's jurisdiction.
The court did not provide much of an analysis of that question. To an-
swer that question it may well have been appropriate to look to other
sections of the statute. The civil sections indicate that a "sewer system" is
a separate concept from "water in the state," the sewer system being
more of a conveyance to a water in the state. Under this interpretation,
the conviction would have been overturned.
Another defensive argument with respect to the charge under section
26.2121(a) would have been that no water pollution occurred and none
was threatened. If the material was easily treated by the treatment plant,
then this would have been a potentially successful defense. While this
defense would not apply to the second charge under section 26.2121(d),
the defendant could have argued that it did not cause the discharge of a
material from a point source that violates any permit, rule, or order.
Again, if the discharge to the sewer was properly treated and did not
discharge to a water body, then there would have been no discharge from
a point source. In other words, it seems fully supportable to construe a
discharge to a sewer as not violating these criminal provisions.
If the Houston Court of Appeal's interpretation of the definition of
"water in the state" under these criminal provisions of the Texas Water
Code is widely held, it could create a wide net which would ensnare indi-
viduals and corporations who discharge into municipal sewer systems.
The question arises not only for those who may not have any discharge
authority from the municipality or local government operating the public
owned treatment works and associated collection system, but perhaps for
those which discharge materials in excess of the parameters allowed in
their authorization or which discharge materials not included within that
authority. Closer scrutiny of its discharge authority and the levels and
types of materials being discharged by any industrial or commercial en-
tity would be advised. Such actions would potentially reduce the possibil-
ity of criminal prosecution.
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions during the Survey period interpreting environmental
laws may have significant implications. The close scrutiny applied by the
Austin Court of Appeals could make it difficult to obtain a hazardous
waste facility permit. The interpretation of the criminal provisions of the
126. Id. at 631-32.
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Texas Water Code could expose any party who discharges into any sewer
without any government authorization or in excess of that authorization.
Thus, the environmental cases reviewed for this Survey period create po-
tential problems for persons regulated under environmental laws in
Texas.

